ON THE COORDINATION OF THE EUROPEAN AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL AND WATER INTERNALIZING POLICIES by Martin, Elsa & Stahn, Hubert
ON THE COORDINATION OF THE EUROPEAN
AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL AND WATER
INTERNALIZING POLICIES
Elsa Martin, Hubert Stahn
To cite this version:
Elsa Martin, Hubert Stahn. ON THE COORDINATION OF THE EUROPEAN AGRI-
ENVIRONMENTAL AND WATER INTERNALIZING POLICIES. 2009. <halshs-00360993>
HAL Id: halshs-00360993
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00360993
Submitted on 12 Feb 2009
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
        GREQAM 
   Groupement de Recherche en Economie 
Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - UMR-CNRS 6579 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales 
Universités d'Aix-Marseille II et III 
Document de Travail 
         n°2009- 
 
 
 
ON THE COORDINATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
WATER INTERNALIZING POLICIES 
 
 
 
Elsa MARTIN 
Hubert STAHN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the coordination of the European agri-environmental and
water internalizing policies
Elsa MARTIN∗and Hubert STAHN
GREQAM†, University of Aix-Marseille II
January 6, 2009
Abstract
The point of departure of this work is the lack of coordination of european environmental
internalizing policies. At the national level, while the water authority generally has to inter-
nalize the negative externalities of water extraction, the agricultural one aims at encouraging
environmentally friendly one. More locally, considering an aquifer as being the only vector of
environmental eﬀects, we show that the externalities occuring can compensate themselves in
such a way that the open-loop Nash game played by the two distinct authorities in charge of
these policies is ineﬃcient. In this special case, we propose to implement a coordinated policy
based on a double fiscal scheme also showed budget balanced.
Keywords: water policy, agricultural policy, externalities.
J.E.L. classification numbers: H23, Q18, Q28.
1. Introduction
The negative externalities of natural resources exploitation are a well documented problem in the
economic literature and many internalizing instruments had been theoretically studied. Nowadays,
these well-known instruments are also eﬀectively used in the real world. For instance, in the
European Union (EU), the concepts of "full cost recovery" had been introduced in the Water
Framework Directive (WFD) of 20001: this directive asks the member states to make sure that all
externalities of water resources extraction are internalized. For this purpose, the recommendation
to the national water authorities is to incorporate them into the price of the resource.
On the other hand, in 1998, the OECD Agriculture Ministers adopted the concept of multi-
functionality as a policy principle; this concept "recognizes that beyond its primary function of
supplying food and fibre, agricultural activity can also shape the landscape, provide environmental
benefits such as land conservation, the sustainable management of renewable natural resources and
∗Corresponding author: elsa.martin@univmed.fr
†Adress : Château Lafarge, Route des Milles 13290 Les Milles - FRANCE Tel : +33 442 935 980
1See European parlament (2000).
the preservation of biodiversity, and contribute to the socioeconomic viability of many rural areas"
(OECD, 2001). It is why, among other things, in 2003, the CAP reform intensified environmen-
tal concerns in agricultural policies through proposing to internalize the environmental amenities
linked with the agricultural activities.
At the member states level, these two sets of policies are implemented by two diﬀerent au-
thorities: one is in charge of the water sector and the other of the agricultural one. The lack
of coordination between both when they internalize environmental externalities can induce ineﬃ-
ciencies. Dworak, Kranz, Karaczun and Herbke (2006) recommend to coordinate these authorities
intervention. We are going to propose a model illustrating this view.
From the best of our knowledge, the seminal conceptual framework concerned with interactions
between agricultural and environmental policies was proposed by Just and Antle (1990). They
demonstrated that the agricultural policies are structured so that undesirable environmental ef-
fects can be mitigated if policies are appropriately designed and administrated. Johnson, Wolcott
and Aradhyula (1990) supported this view by emphasizing that the programs structure and the
institutional setting are important conditioning factors. Finally, during the same debate, Hrubov-
cak, Leblanc and Miranowski (1990) illustrated some of the diﬃculties of coordinating agricultural
and environmental policies when altering agricultural chemical use.
But, as underlined by Just, Bust and Donoso (1991), these studies simply serve to "better
understand the interface of agricultural and resource policy". Following this point of view, Weinberg
and Kling (1996) proposed to go further: they studied the opportunities to better coordinate the
two types of policies. They concentrated on irrigation water policies in the West and policies for the
control of drainage from irrigated agriculture. They specified a social objective in order to examine,
both conceptually and empirically, the welfare losses associated with uncoordinated policy making.
More recently, Gomez-Limon, Arriaza and Berbel (2002), within the framework of the European
WFD and CAP policies, examine the relationships between these policies. Their empirical work,
applied to a case study in central Spain, shows that the two policies must be coordinated in order
to meet socioeconomic goals (farmers’ income and labour demand) and environmental protection
(water-use eﬃciency). Horan, Shortle and Abler (2004) studied the coordination and design of
point-nonpoint trading programs and agri-environmental policies. They looked at the condition
under which coordination of these policies can induce eﬃciency gains.
All these papers are primarily concerned with agricultural production externalities, these latter
one possibly being either positive or negative. In our work, we want to concentrate on a less studied
case: the one in which environmental amenities are jointly produced by the agricultural sector, the
negative environmental externalities coming from another economic activity. Concentrating on
an organic agricultural production, we will then look at the strategic interactions between a water
authority and an agricultural one, both of them having environmental concerns in mind. The water
authority will be in charge of the regulation of the resource extraction and the agricultural one of the
amenities supplied by the organic production of food. Furthermore, taking the strong links between
groundwater and agriculture as a point of departure, we will assume that all the environmental
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eﬀects pass through an aquifer. This will add some dynamic into the problem. Following Provencher
and Burt’s (1993) typology, we will consider two types of quantity externalities: the stock one will
be related to the existence value of the aquifer reserve and the pumping cost one will capture the
congestion eﬀects of the withdrawals on the stock height. Since agricultural production is often
blamed for its negative impact on water quality, we will also take into account a quality externality.
In order to do so, we are going to partly follow Roseta-Palma (2002) who introduced for the first
time both quantity and quality concerns into a groundwater management setting. She proposed to
distinguish between a dilution eﬀect depending on the groundwater stock size and a filter one linked
with the farmers’ irrigations. Since the aquifer considered here will only be replenished thanks to
surface irrigations, we will assume that above an aquifer height threshold, when the stock increases,
the irrigation water that is percolating is less filtered and the quality deteriorated.
More precisely, we are going to consider, on the one hand, a group of farmers producing food in a
traditional organic way (using surface water conveyed thanks to gravity and with very few chemicals
added) and selling it on a competitive market to consumers. This production will be assumed to
strongly participate to an aquifer replenishment, thanks to percolations allowed by the irrigations2;
for clarity sake, the relation between food production and percolations will be postulated linear.
On the other hand, the groundwater hence generated will be assumed to be purchased on another
competitive market by the consumers to a water distribution agency. We will then assume that an
equilibrium with respect to the choice of the resource had already been reached: surface water is
used for agricultural production and groundwater for domestic consumption. Such a scheme can
induce several quantity and quality externalities. But in the real world, some aquifers are more
concerned with quality problems and some other with quantity one. We will thus concentrate
on the second type, focusing on a setting in which the externalities previously presented finally
compensate themselves in such a way that only a discounting eﬀect is remaining.
In such a case, the basic optimal intertemporal groundwater policy of a water authority consists
in taxing the resource extractions in order to slow down the extractions of the resource otherwise
subject to overexploitation: this corresponds to the European Union recommendations laying in the
WFD. But because of some ineﬃciencies remaining, an agricultural policy can also be at work at the
same time in order to internalize them, in such a way that it is as if both the authorities were playing
an open-loop Nash game. Since this is the case within the framework of the CAP reform of 2003,
we will refer to this situation as an European Uncoordinated Water and Agricultural Internalizing
Policies (UWAIP) setting. According to our parameters values, we will see that in such a setting,
the optimal intertemporal agricultural policy can either consists in taxing or subsidizing the food
traditional organic production. But we will show that the implementation of such an UWAIP
rarely coincides with the eﬃcient solution. We will then propose to implement a coordinated policy
consisting in taxing the groundwater consumption and always (whatever the set of parameters is)
subsidizing the organic farming production in order to reach the socially-optimal level of surface
2Note that this particular situation is not a pure fiction since it is frequent in most areas characterized by a
Mediterranean climate. It is why Brown and Deacon (1972) proposed to take into account percolations when defining
a pigovian tax on groundwater extractions.
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irrigation water percolations to the aquifer located below. We will finally conclude by showing that
in such a situation, it is always possible to finance the agri-environmental fiscal transfer with the
money collected thanks to the groundwater taxation.
Our argument will be organized in the following way. We introduce in section 2 our dynamic
model. Section 3 will be devoted to the characterization of the environmental externalities of food
and groundwater consumption. In section 4, we will explain why the lack of coordination between
water and agricultural internalizing policies can induce ineﬃciencies. Section 5 will be devoted to
the coordinated policy being able to decentralize the eﬃcient solution thanks to a double fiscal
scheme. We will finally conclude and propose some potential extensions.
2. The model
Since we assume that all environmental external eﬀects pass through an aquifer, its law of motion
will represent the ecological system considered. The consumer’s environmental preferences will thus
be fully determined by this height.
Futhermore, we do not want to enter into the debate related to the conjunctive use of water
resources. We thus assume that an equilibrium with respect to the choice of the water resource
had already been reached: groundwater will be consumed for domestic uses and the agricultural
production will be made possible only thanks to surface water irrigations.
2.1. The simplified ecological system
We consider a small closed economy composed of consumers and producers who are located above
an aquifer. At time t, the first one consume an amount gt of groundwater for domestic use (this
water is assumed to be clean: it is drinkable without the need of any treatment) and an amount ft
of agricultural food. The latter one is assumed to be sold on a pure and perfect competitive market
by homogeneous atomistics farmers and the first one by a distribution agency. Also considering
homogeneous consumers, we will reason on a representative consumer and a representative producer.
The production of food generates a by-product: percolations of an amount bft of surface water to
the aquifer. For clarity sake, a fixed linear relation between the amount of irrigated food produced
and the aquifer height is assumed. Crops are supposed to be grown up in a traditional organic way.
The water table is described as a function of time which is obtained, as in most of the papers
of the literature on the subject, by equating "rate in" minus "rate out" with the impact on the
water table height, h˙(t) := h˙t where ht ∈]0, 1[ ∀t 6= 0 is a percentage of height. The aquifer height
motion is thus described by the following diﬀerential equation:
h˙t = bft − gt (2.1)
where b > 0.
We also assume that the initial groundwater height is equal to its natural hydrologic equilibrium:
h0 = 1. Rubio and Casino (2001) define this level as the one "corresponding to the maximum water
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table elevation at which the water reserves coincide with the storage capacity of the aquifer". They
added that with such an assumption, "the human activity, justified by economic parameters, consists
of mining the aquifer until an economic hydrologic equilibrium has been reached". So, with such
an assumption, the aquifer considered must face a quantity management problem and will never
overflow.
2.2. The producers
Food and groundwater are the two market goods considered in our economy.
2.2.1. The representative groundwater distribution supplier
Drinkable water distribution is generally associated with strong and expensive networks of canals
and pipes. The presence and the importance of the costs associated with such networks can be
the origin of natural monopoly situations. It is why the water distribution is generally delegated
by local or central governments to a private firm through an auction mechanism: the networks
building investments are made by this authority (thanks to lump-sum taxes imposed to consumers
for instance) and the private firm is in charge of operating and maintaining costs. The government
then chooses the firm proposing the cheapest price.
Considering atomistics and homogeneous firms makes them compete on a pure and perfect
market in order to win the water distribution task. But we do not want to model this mechanism
here. We will rather focus on its outcome which is a groundwater unit price, πt, equal to its
marginal cost:
πt (ht) = κ(ht)
where the marginal cost κ(ht) is a decreasing function since a low height is associated with high
energy needs and thus high pumping costs.
In order to fully characterize and compare the solutions of the optimal control problems that we
are going to study, we need to specify all our functions. The total cost of groundwater distribution
at time t, κ(ht)gt, will be assumed to depend on both the amount of water extracted and on the
pumping lift rate (1− ht), in a linear way. The marginal cost of pumping groundwater will thus
take the following form:
κ(ht) := κ− ht
It is thus assumed to be composed of:
• a fixed part κ > 0 due to the hydrologic cone,
• another part negatively proportional to the groundwater height due to the energy needed in
order to pump water.
Notice that κ corresponds to the aquifer height from which extraction costs are null.
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2.2.2. The representative organic farmer
The organic agricultural production is assumed to be sold on a pure and perfect competitive market.
The production costs, c(ft), are assumed proportional to the amount of food produced:
c(ft) := cft
where c > 0. At the equilibrium of the market, the unit price of the food is equal to its marginal
cost such that:
pt = c
Note that since the marginal costs of this producer are equal to their average one, considering
a pure and perfect competitive markets means that, at the equilibrium, his profits are null.
2.3. The representative consumer
The consumer is assumed to consume an amount ft of food and gt of groundwater at time t. For
clarity sake, the utility generated from this consumption is assumed fully separable in both goods:
u (ft), resp. υ (gt), denotes the willingness to pay for food, resp. for groundwater consumption.
Futhermore, the complete utility function will be written as: U(ft, gt, ht) = u (ft)+υ (gt)+e (ht)+
m(ft, gt, ht) where:
• m(ft, gt, ht) is the amount of money remaining to the consumer after having bought ground-
water and food;
• and e (ht) is an indicator of this consumer’s environmental preferences. These environmental
concerns are assumed to be fully determined by the aquifer height, ht.
Recalling that the market prices are set at their competitive level (given by the marginal costs
of the goods), the surplus from food, s(ft), and groundwater, σ(gt), consumption are given by the
following expressions:
s(ft) = u(ft)− cft
σ(gt, ht) = υ(gt)− κ(ht)gt
More specifically, the utility from the consumption of both goods will be assumed quadratic
(and thus concave): υ(gt) := αgt − 12g2t and u(ft) := aft −
1
2f
2
t where α, a > 0 and quasi-linear in
money.3 Hence, if the consumer is endowed with a constant budget B4 through time, the amount
of money that is remaining for the other goods when food and water have been consumed is:
3Note that since these functions are increasing with the first units and decreasing with the last one the position
of the maximum is of importance. It is why it would have been more correct to rather reason on the functions
υ(gt) := Max
©
αgt − 12g
2
t ,
1
2
α2
ª
and u(ft) := Max
©
aft − 12f
2
t ,
1
2
a2
ª
. But since parameters a and α can always be
chosen suﬃciently high in order to check the "good position" of the maximum, we will work on the simpler functions
proposed in the text.
4We can consider that the building costs needed by the government to construct the groundwater distribution
networks are deducted from this amount, through a lump-sum tax for instance.
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m(ft, gt, ht) := B − cft − κ (ht) gt. For clarity sake and because of not modifying our results, the
budget variable B will be omitted. The consumption of food generating the maximum amount of
surplus, s(ft), is assumed strictly positive: d := a− c > 0. Furthermore, when the aquifer tends to
be empty (ht → 0), the consumer must be able to use another type of water resource, the demand
for groundwater hence going to zero. Thus, even if this possibility is outside the scope of this work,
it is reasonable to assume that α− κ := 0.
We also announced that our consumer worries about the environment and that these concerns
are fully represented by the aquifer height. On the one hand, we assume that the groundwater
quality can get deteriorated when the stock height is increasing: a higher stock means that the
surface water which is infiltrating to the ground is less filtered. Note that this is not true for
every heights of the stock. So, we are going to assume that this phenomena is occurring when
the groundwater stock level is higher than a threshold such that 0 < h¯ < 1. But when it is lower
than this height, the groundwater can be considered as becoming physically scarce, also inducing
a disutility to the consumer (which can be linked with an existence value for instance). So it is as
if there was a physical threshold of the groundwater stock height, h¯, inducing no disutility to the
consumer. These environmental concerns are captured by the function e(ht) which properties can
be summed up as:
• de(ht)dht > 0 for ht < h¯,
• de(ht)dht < 0 for ht > h¯.
It is why we decided to specify this function as: e(ht) := −12
¡
ht − h¯
¢2. Note that this function
captures non-marketable environmental eﬀects.
Finally, the expressions used in order to fully characterize and compare our dynamic solutions
will be the following one:
U(ft, gt, ht) = −
1
2
g2t + htgt + dft −
1
2
f2t −
1
2
¡
ht − h¯
¢2
σ(gt, ht) = −
1
2
g2t + htgt
s(ft) = dft −
1
2
f2t
3. The environmental dynamic externalities of food and groundwater consump-
tion
In the myopic competitive case, the consumer does not take into account the impact of his con-
sumption choices on the hydrologic system. This leads to ineﬃciencies with respect to a central
planner program. We are going to check this after having defined the myopic competitive and the
eﬃcient solutions.
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Definition 3.1. The myopic competitive equilibrium paths of groundwater and food consumption
{gmt (ht), fmt } are given by the maximization of the consumer’s utility at each time t:
{gmt (ht), fmt } ∈ argmax
ft,gt
U(ft, gt, ht)
The necessary FOC (First Order Conditions) of this problem give the short-run demand func-
tions for groundwater and food:
dυ(gt)
dgt
= κ(ht)
du(ft)
dft
= c
These equations illustrate a classical result according to which, at each time t, the myopic
competitive allocation of groundwater and food are such that the private marginal utility of each
one consumption equals its private marginal cost.
Proposition 3.2. Within the framework of our specific functional forms5, the myopic competitive
intertemporal paths can be written as:
hmt = g
m
t = h
m
e + (1− hme ) e−t ∀t
fmt = f
m
e = d ∀t
where the aquifer height at the steady state is denoted hme = bd.
At the steady state of this myopic competitive setting, which is denoted by e and for which
t→∞, we observe that the amount of groundwater consumed is equal to the by-product maximizing
the food utility function. Recalling that the initial groundwater height is always higher than the
steady state one since it is equal to unity, we have that:
• the aquifer stock is decreasing along time and so is the amount of groundwater consumed;
• the myopic competitive demand of food is the same one at each time and so are the percola-
tions to the aquifer induced by this food production.
We now move to the characterization of an eﬃcient path of consumption. In such a setting,
it is as if a central planner was choosing the optimal paths of food and groundwater to consume,
knowing perfectly the impacts of these consumptions on the aquifer height.
5Since we focus on the interior solutions, we implicitly restrict our parameters in such a way that bd < 1.
Furthermore, if parameters b and d are too small, this can lead to a negative utility because of the externalities hence
becoming too severe.
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Definition 3.3. The optimal paths of groundwater and food consumption {g∗t (ht), f∗t (ht)} are
given by the maximization of the present value of the consumer’s utility stream:
max
ft,gt
∞Z
0
U(ft, gt, ht)e−rtdt
s.t. : h˙t = bft − gt with h0 = 1
where 0 < r < 1 is the discount factor.
In order to solve this problem, we are going to use the maximum principle. Let H denotes the
current value Hamiltonian of this problem:
H(ht, gt, ft, µt) = υ(gt)− κ(ht)gt + u(ft)− cft + e(ht) + µt (bft − gt)
The eﬃcient solution thus satisfies the conditions:
dυ(gt)
dgt
= κ(ht) + µt h˙t = bft − gt
du(ft)
dft
+ bµt = c
µ˙t
µt
= r + dκ(ht)dht
gt
µt
− de(ht)dht
1
µt
which, along with the following transversality condition, are necessary:
lim
t→∞
e−rtµt = 0
The shadow price of the groundwater stock, µt, reflects the opportunity costs (resp. benefits)
associated with the unavailability (resp. availability) in the future of any unit of water consumed
(resp. which is percolating) in the present. Its rate of variation along time, µ˙tµt , reflects the ex-
ternalities that a myopic competitive solution fails to internalize with respect to a central planner
solution:
• the pumping cost externality lies in this rate decrease with the consumption of groundwater:
dκ(ht)
dht
gt
µt
,
• the quality externality occurs when the aquifer height is higher than h¯ and lies in the rate
increase with −de(ht)dht
1
µt
,
• the stock externality occurs when the aquifer height is lower than h¯ (when it becomes physi-
cally scarce) and lies in the rate decrease with −de(ht)dht
1
µt
.
Note that there is a market for the pumping cost externality, through κ(ht), but not for the quality
and stock one since e(ht) represents an environmental preference.
Proposition 3.4. Using our specific functional forms6, the eﬃcient intertemporal paths can be
written as:
µ∗t =
h¯
r + 1
, f∗t = d+
bh¯
r + 1
∀t
h∗t = h
∗
e + (1− h∗e) e−t
g∗t = g
∗
e + (1− h∗e) e−t
6We need to impose the following restriction on our parameters in order to avoid that the aquifer overflows:
d <
r+1−h¯(b2+1)
b(r+1) . Notice that this condition is stronger than the one needed in the myopic competitive case, bd < 1.
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where g∗e = bd+
h¯b2
r+1 and h
∗
e = bd+
h¯(b2+1)
r+1 .
We can then directly deduce from the previous elements that:
• the shadow price of the groundwater stock is positive and constant along time which means
that our specifications make the three previous externalities compensate themselves in such
a way that only a discounting eﬀect proportional to the physical aquifer height inducing no
disutility to the consumer, i.e. h¯, is remaining;
• the eﬃcient amount of food consumed is the same one at each period of time and it is
increasing with the shadow price of the groundwater stock, in a way proportional to the
percolation coeﬃcient,
• the eﬃcient paths of groundwater consumption and aquifer height are decreasing along time
and the eﬃcient paths of groundwater consumed is related to the shadow price of the aquifer in
a negative way: the resource extraction is slowed down with respect to the myopic competitive
case.
It is because of the form of the shadow price, µ∗t , that we can say that the aquifer considered
here is more facing quantity problems than quality one. This is consistent with the two previous
assumptions according to which: (i) the aquifer is only replenished thanks to traditional organic
agriculture (no rainfall) and (ii) the human activity, justified by economic parameters, consists of
mining the aquifer until an economic hydrologic equilibrium has been reached (h0 = 1).
In order to check the ineﬃciency of the myopic competitive solution, we are now going to
compare it with the eﬃcient one.
Proposition 3.5. The comparisons of the eﬃcient and myopic competitive intertemporal solutions
tell us that:
(i) the eﬃcient aquifer height is always higher,
(ii) the eﬃcient volume of groundwater consumed can also be higher after a transition phase
during which it is lower,
(iii) the eﬃcient amount of food consumed is always higher,
(iv) all the diﬀerences are increasing along time except the one in food consumption which is
temporally constant.
The phenomena lying in (ii) is due to the fact that the amount of food consumed (and hence
the percolations to the aquifer) is also controlled in the eﬃcient case, making it possible to consume
higher amounts of groundwater without reducing the aquifer height. Notice also that the date of
the end of this transition phase, t = − ln b21+b2 , is increasing with the percolation coeﬃcient.
All these results strongly depend on the fact that only a discounting externality is remaining
in our setting.
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4. The lack of coordination between water and agricultural internalizing policies
National policies aiming at internalizing food and groundwater consumption externalities as the one
identified in the previous section are generally delegated to diﬀerent administrations without any
coordination between both. In our setting, we can think of a water authority and an agricultural
one playing an open-loop Nash game: they commit themselves at the moment of starting to an
entire temporal path of groundwater consumption for the first one and of food consumption for the
second one, each one maximizing the present value of the consumer’s surplus stream with respect
to each good, the consumption path chosen by the other being given and incorporated into the
groundwater height motion.
These authorities will also take into account the environmental concerns of the consumers.
But according to the weight put by each one of these administrations on these preferences, the
ineﬃciencies due to the lack of coordination between both will diﬀer. We are going to focus on
these ineﬃciencies.
4.1. The general case of Uncoordinated Water and Agricultural Internalizing Policies
(UWAIP)
In the more general case, the agricultural authority puts a weight 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 on environmental
concerns and the water one another one denoted 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1. Why would they put diﬀerent weights
on these concerns? Precisely because they do not coordinate on this goal.
Definition 4.1. The equilibrium paths of groundwater and food consumption
©
gol(ht), fol(ht)
ª
in an UWAIP setting are given by the simultaneous maximizations of the present value of the
consumer’s surplus with respect to (i) food and to (ii) groundwater consumption, both programs
taking into account the consumer’s preferences for environmental concerns in a weighted way:
(i)
max
ft
∞Z
0
[s (ft) + we (ht)] e−rtdt
s.t. : h˙t = bft − g¯t with h0 = 1
where g¯t is the optimal groundwater consumption path chosen by the water authority;
(ii)
max
gt
∞Z
0
[σ(gt, ht) + ωe (ht)] e−rtdt
s.t. : h˙t = bf¯t − gt with h0 = 1
where f¯t is the optimal food consumption path chosen by the agricultural authority.
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This double problem can be solved using the maximum principle; it admits two current value
Hamiltonians:
Hf (ht, ft, pt) = s (ft) + we (ht) + pt (bft − g¯t)
Hg(ht, gt, λt) = σ(gt, ht) + ωe (ht) + λt
¡
bf¯t − gt
¢
where λt is the shadow price of the aquifer taking into account by the water authority and pt the
one by the agricultural authority. The necessary conditions are the following one:
dυ(gt)
dgt
= κ(ht) + λt
du(ft)
dft
+ bpt = c
h˙t = bft − gt
λ˙t
λt
= r + dκ(ht)dht
gt
λt
− de(ht)dht
ω
λt
p˙t
pt
= r − de(ht)dht
w
pt
lim
t→∞
e−rtλt = 0 lim
t→∞
e−rtpt = 0
The main diﬀerence between this UWAIP case and the eﬃcient one lies in the presence of two
shadow prices. We can furthermore notice that the rate of variation along the time of the shadow
price taking into account by the water administration is the same one as in the eﬃcient case. But
it is not true for the one considered by the agricultural authority since it only concentrates on
non-market eﬀects, through e(ht), and not on the market one linked with the pumping costs.
Proposition 4.2. Using our specifications7, the uncoordinated intertemporal paths can be written
as:
folt = f
ol
e +
bw(1−hole )
ρ−r e
ρt golt = g
ol
e +
(1−hole )(r−ρ+ω)
r+1−ρ e
ρt
holt = h
ol
e +
¡
1− hole
¢
eρt
polt = p
ol
e +
w(1−hole )
ρ−r e
ρt λolt = λ
ol
e +
(1−ω)(1−hole )
r+1−ρ e
ρt
where gole =
br[d(r+ω)+bh¯w]
wb2(r+1)+r(r+ω) , f
ol
e =
r[d(r+ω)+bh¯w]
wb2(r+1)+r(r+ω) , h
ol
e =
b(r+1)(dr+h¯wb)+rh¯ω
wb2(r+1)+r(r+ω) , p
ol
e =
w[−bd(r+1)+rh¯]
wb2(r+1)+r(r+ω) ,
λole =
rbd(1−ω)+h¯(wb2+ωr)
wb2(r+1)+r(r+ω) and ρ < 0.
It is first interesting to note that the shadow price of the groundwater stock taken into account
by the water authority is always positive in this general UWAIP setting. This means that she
always (whatever the weights are) gives incentives to reduce the amount of groundwater consumed,
with respect to a myopic competitive solution.
Furthermore, it is easy to check that the amount of groundwater consumed and the aquifer
height are decreasing along time. On the contrary, the amount of food consumed is increasing
along time; the shadow price taken into by the agricultural policy can be either positive or negative,
hence possibly inducing either a decrease or an increase of food consumption with respect of the
myopic competitive case.
All our results are summed up in the synoptic table of results presented in figure E.1 (see the
appendix).
7When polt < 0, since the agricultural authority has no incentive to slow down the decrease of food consumption,
we have to restrict our parameters such that fole (r − ρ) > bw
¡
1− hole
¢
in order to check that this consumption is
positive all along the path. Finally, we also need to restrict our parameters values in order to insure that the aquifer
never overflow by imposing hole < 1.
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4.2. The European case after the Water Framework Directive (WFD) of 2000
In practice, the over-extraction of water resources is a widely known problem. It is why, in 2000,
the European Union proposed a common framework to its members states concerning their water
resource management: the Water Framework Directive. Among others, this directive is asking the
states to make sure that water is sold at its real value, including the non-market one. Following
this law, a national authority in charge of the water taxation policy concentrates on groundwater
consumption surplus and environmental preferences.
The level of consumption of food is thus considered as being fixed at the myopic competitive
one. But this authority is perfectly able to know the amount of percolations to the aquifer induced
by this consumption. So the problem to solve is a particular case of the one stated in definition
4.1, with (w,ω) = (0, 1).
Proposition 4.2 directly gives us the stable intertemporal WFD paths leading to the stationary
equilibrium (gωe , h
ω
e , λ
ω
e ) as:
λωt =
h¯
r + 1
∀t
hωt = h
ω
e + (1− hωe ) e−t
gωt = g
ω
e + (1− hωe ) e−t
where gωe = bd and h
ω
e = bd+
h¯
r+1 .
We observe that in a WFD setting, the shadow price of the aquifer is constant along time and
equal to the eﬃcient one since the same discounting eﬀect is remaining.
Proposition 4.3. The comparison of these WFD paths and steady states,
(i) with the myopic competitive one, tells us that they are always higher or equal,
(ii) and with the eﬃcient one, that they are always lower.
So, even if theWFD can induce a welfare increase with respect to a myopic competitive situation,
it is always worse than an eﬃcient solution, as defined previously. Furthermore, the proof of
proposition 4.3 tells us that, at the WFD and myopic competitive steady states, the consumptions
are the same one although the aquifer height are diﬀerent. This comes from the fact that, at
each time before the steady state, the amount of groundwater consumed in the myopic competitive
setting is strictly higher than the one consumed in the WFD setting.
4.3. A new framework: the second pillar of the CAP
In practice, the agricultural sector is often blamed for the ineﬃciencies remaining. It is why, among
other reasons, in 2003, the European Common Agricultural Policy has moved to recommendations
focusing more on environmental aspects of the agricultural production.
So the European context is quite diﬀerent from the previous isolated WFD one which constitutes
a very particular case of our general UWAIP setting since no game is really played because only
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the water authority is intervening. Here, we are going to add a national agricultural authority
intervention to the water one and a game is now going to be played between both. Each one is
going to take into account the full environmental preferences of the consumers: (w,ω) = (1, 1). We
will refer to such a case as the European UWAIP one.
We then directly deduce the paths leading to the new stationary equilibrium (gωwe , h
ωw
e , λ
ωw
e , p
ωw
e )
characterizing the European uncoordinated setting as:
fωwt = f
ωw
e +
b(1−hωwe )
φ−r e
φt gωwt = g
ωw
e + (1− hωwe ) eφt
hωwt = h
ωw
e + (1− hωwe ) eφt
pωwt = p
ωw
e +
1−hωwe
φ−r e
φt λωwt =
h¯
r+1 ∀t
where gωwe =
br[d(r+1)+bh¯]
(r+1)(r+b2) , f
ωw
e =
r[d(r+1)+bh¯]
(r+1)(r+b2) , h
ωw
e =
b(r+1)(dr+bh¯)+rh¯
(r+1)(r+b2) , p
ωw
e =
−bd(r+1)+rh¯
(r+1)(r+b2) and
φ = −12 +
1
2r −
1
2
√
1 + 2r + r2 + 4b2.
In such an European UWAIP setting, the shadow prices of the aquifer taken into account by
the water and by the agricultural administrations diﬀer in such a way that:
• the one of the water authority is constant along time and equal to the eﬃcient one (and
consequently to the one corresponding to theWFD setting) since only the negative discounting
eﬀect of myopic competitive groundwater withdrawals is internalized by this authority,
• the one of the agricultural authority evolves along time according to the aquifer height, in
a way strongly dependant on the value of h¯ since the agricultural authority internalizes the
positive or negative (according to the set of parameters) quality and stock externalities but
not the pumping cost one.
Proposition 4.4. (i) In an European UWAIP setting, the shadow price of the aquifer taken into
account by the agricultural authority is always lower than the one of the eﬃcient case. It can
furthermore either be positive or negative since, depending on the parameters values, the quality
externality can be considered as being more important than the stock one, or the opposite.
(ii) The amount of food consumed in an European UWAIP setting can either be lower or higher
than the one obtained in a WFD setting, depending on the sign of pωwe . But it is always lower than
the eﬃcient one.
Because of the exponential functions, comparisons of the groundwater consumption and aquifer
height equilibrium paths between the European UWAIP settings and the one previously obtained
are less obvious. We thus propose to further work on numerical examples. Considering the more
frequent situation in which polt < 0 ∀t, the simulations example stated in appendix H tells us that
there are some parameters sets for which the European UWAIP setting is worse than the WFD one,
all along the paths. Furthermore, appendix I shows that the UWAIP setting equilibria are lower
than the one of the eﬃcient setting at each time if the shadow price of the agricultural authority is
negative and that the two solutions becomes very similar if the set of parameters induces a possible
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positivity of this shadow price. But if we recall that the amount of food consumed in an UWAIP
setting is always lower than the eﬃcient one, we can conclude that the UWAIP setting is always
ineﬃcient. This conclusion can be checked by computing the Net Present Value (NPV) of future
utility stream in the two case: NPV ∗ −NPV ol = 5, 01 for the set of parameters for which polt < 0
∀t and NPV ∗ −NPV ol = 0, 001 for the other set.8
4.4. Where do the ineﬃciencies come from?
We shew that a European UWAIP setting is ineﬃcient. The main question here is to know why.
In order to answer, we are going to check if other special cases of UWAIP are also ineﬃcient. The
two other likely settings are:
(i) the one where only the agricultural authority is internalizing the quality and the stock
externalities: (w,ω) = (1, 0), denoted w;
(ii) and the one where both authorities internalize them in equal share: (w,ω) = (12 ,
1
2), denoted
es.
Since the comparisons with the myopic and eﬃcient cases are as diﬃcult as in the European UWAIP
setting (because of the exponential function), we will directly work on simulations. For this purpose,
we will run the NPV and compare them in the eﬃcient, the myopic and the various UWAIP cases
for diﬀerent sets of parameters9. Values are summed up in appendix J.
The main result is that any of the UWAIP cases studied is eﬃcient although UWAIP settings
are welfare improving with respect to the myopic competitive case. The exception pointed out by
our simulation is the case (i): the NPV can then be even worse than the myopic competitive one,
specially for a low value of the aquifer height threshold, h¯. The sensibility of this case with respect
to this threshold is special since we also observe that all the diﬀerences increase with h¯ except the
one related to this case: they are decreasing for the set of parameters such that polt < 0 ∀t and
there is no clear trend for the other set.
The sensibility of case (i) to the aquifer height threshold shows us that the ineﬃciencies do
not only come from the lack of coordination of the authorities on stock and quality externalities.
The pumping cost one also plays a crucial role. Indeed, in this case where only the agricultural
authority is internalizing the non-marketable externalities, if, for instance, she has to give incentive
to consume more food in order to increase aquifer replenishment and hence height, the water
authority will refrain groundwater consumption fewer because of only internalizing pumping cost
externalities. And the aquifer height will remain low. The two authorities will then make incentives
in opposite ways because of pursuing conflicting goals.
In other words, the ineﬃciencies of UWAIP do not only come from the lack of coordination of
agricultural and water administrations on environmental goals, e(ht), but also from the fact that
8The reader can be surprised of these very low values but it is due to the scale chosen: the NPV are also very low.
9Note that the set of parameters inducing an interior solution will be diﬀerent from the one previously chosen
since the condition insuring that the aquifer never overflows becomes stronger in the w case than in the eﬃcient
one. Futhermore, with the new set of parameters chosen, the real eigenvalue ρ is going to possibly become complex
because of the square root it contains. But the imaginary parts will be neglected because of being next to zero.
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an authority in charge of the agricultural policy generally do not aim at internalizing marketable
externalities (like the pumping cost one) which are under the jurisdiction of another authority:
the water one. We explained that in the eﬃcient case, the various externalities identified in our
model compensate themselves in such a way that only what we called a discounting eﬀect is re-
maining. But if various authorities aim at internalizing each of them without taking into account
this compensation phenomena, the output can not be eﬃcient.
5. A coordinated budget-balanced fiscal internalizing policy: groundwater taxa-
tion and food subsidy
The question that we want to answer now is: how to implement an eﬃcient solution in such a
setting? We are going to concentrate in this section on the main internalizing instruments used in
Europe: fiscal one.
Theoretically, the implementation of the European UWAIP solution would consist in a double
pigovian transfer:
• a first part implemented by the water authority: a tax constant along time, Tωw = λωwe ,
imposed on every unit of groundwater consumed at each time,
• a second one by the agricultural authority: a transfer for every unit of food consumed,
Sωwt = bp
ωw
t , evolving along time and possibly being either positive or negative depending
on the shadow price of the resource, i.e. it can be either a tax or a subsidy. Note that this
transfer is proportional to the percolation coeﬃcient because it is the by-product of this food
which needs to be internalized.
But in the real world, it would be very diﬃcult to make such a theoretical fiscal scheme ac-
ceptable by the consumers since it is evolving at each period of time according to the aquifer
height, possibly being either positive or negative. A stationary one would be more convenient
and hence more realistic. So, more practically, we can think of the same tax implemented by the
water authority and a stationary transfer, Sωw = bpωwe , on each every amount of agricultural food
consumed.
Proposition 5.1. (i) The implementation of a theoretical (Tωw, Sωwt ) and of a practical (T
ωw, Sωw)
fiscal scheme on food and groundwater consumptions both lead the myopic competitive steady
state consumptions of these market goods to the stationary equilibrium characterizing an Euro-
pean UWAIP setting. The paths leading to this equilibrium within the framework of a theoretical
scheme implementation follows the paths characterizing an European UWAIP. It is not the case for
the paths induced by the practical scheme implementation.
(ii) But these latter one share the same properties as the one simulated in the European UWAIP:
they can induce a better or a worse solution than in the WFD setting and even than in the myopic
competitive one according to the set of parameters.
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(iii) Whatever the set of parameters is, the uncoordinated implementation of a double stationary
pigovian fiscal scheme is never eﬃcient.
More particularly, the proof of (ii), which is more general than the simulation examples previ-
ously taken for the European UWAIP, tells us that the paths of this implementation scheme are
characterized by the following properties:
• if the set of parameters is such that the agricultural authority concentrates on the stock ex-
ternality, pωwe > 0, a double fiscal scheme, even if implemented in an uncoordinated way, is
always better than if a simple fiscal scheme on groundwater consumption had been imple-
mented in an isolated WFD setting and thus than the myopic competitive solution;
• if the set of parameters is such that pωwe < 0, the lack of coordination between the polices is
always worse than an isolated WFD setting and it can even also always10 be the case than
within a myopic competitive setting since the agricultural authority concentrates on a quality
externality (which can only be internalized thanks to an aquifer height decrease) although
the aquifer is facing quantity problems.
The question is now to study how to restore eﬃciency as characterized in definition 3.3. We
propose to implement a distortionary fiscal scheme on food and groundwater consumptions. Such
a policy would be very easy to implement in our setting since the scheme would be constant along
time because of not being related to the groundwater stock: it is given by the aquifer shadow price:
µ∗t = µ
∗
e ∀t. It should take the form of a fixed tax along time T ∗ = µ∗e imposed on each unit of
groundwater consumed and a fixed subsidy along time S∗ = bµ∗e on each unit of food consumed.
Proposition 5.2. The introduction of a pigovian fiscal scheme (T ∗, S∗) in the myopic competitive
program leads to the optimal steady state, on the eﬃcient path. Furthermore, a central government
would always have enough money in order to implement this double fiscal scheme, at the steady
state but also along the path. The lump-sum transfer that she has to distribute to the consumers
at each time t during the transition phase to the steady state in order to be budget-balanced is:
µ∗e
¡
1− h∗ie
¢
e−t.
6. Conclusion
When an aquifer is replenished thanks to an organic agricultural activity and that the groundwater
is consumed in order to satisfy domestic uses, many externalities can occur: pumping cost, stock
and quality one. Internalizing them can induce either an increase of the aquifer height or a decrease.
Within the framework of our model, compensation phenomena occur between them in such a way
that only a discounting eﬀect remains. The absence of intervention can lead to the so-called
groundwater over-exploitation.
10 It is true for the aquifer height when the parameters also check: b2pωwe +
h¯(b2+r)
(r+1)(r+b2)
< 0.
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The European Water Framework Directive precisely consists in avoiding such an output through
taxing the groundwater consumptions to their real economic value. But we shew in proposition
4.3 that, in our setting, some ineﬃciencies are still remaining after the implementation of such a
policy by a water authority. In practice, the agricultural authorities are also asked by the European
Commission to take these ineﬃciencies into account when defining their policy guidelines. We then
defined such a situation as an European UWAIP one because of the water and agricultural author-
ities playing an open-loop Nash game. Note that in such a setting, the groundwater consumption
is still taxed and the food one can either be taxed or subsidized according to the parameters set.
In the special case illustrated by our model, we shew that neither the implementation of a
European WFD setting nor the one of the European UWAIP one leads to an eﬃcient solution. It is
why we proposed to think of a coordinated policy consisting in taxing the groundwater consumption
and always subsidizing the food one. Proposition 5.2 furthermore tells us that a central planner
implementing such a double fiscal scheme would always have enough money to do it: the amount
collected always compensates the one redistributed.
The sensibility of dynamic problems to the discount rate and to the initial conditions is widely
known. It is why we decided to fix them: the initial aquifer height had been assumed to be
at its maximum value as possible and the discount rate at the value proposed by the European
Commission. More research is needed in order to study how our conclusions could diﬀer according
to these parameters values.
In order to implement the eﬃcient solution, we proposed a distortionary fiscal scheme on food
and groundwater consumption. Since we considered a closed economy, we could have proposed to
implement the same fiscal scheme on the production of these goods. The results would have been
the same. But it would also have been interesting to work in an open economy setting11 and to
look at the global implications of such a scheme. Furthermore, we know that water distribution is
rarely made on a competitive market in the real world since our auction mechanism is often biased
by some lobbying phenomena. It would also be interesting to incorporate such political economics
issues in our model.
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A. Proof of proposition 3.2
In order to fully characterize the solution, we solve the problem stated in definition 3.1 by using our functional forms.
The necessary FOC, which are also suﬃcient, give us the short-run demand functions for groundwater and food as:
gmt = h
m
t
fmt = d
We then need to study the long-run demand functions: the paths which are leading to the myopic competitive
steady state (fme , g
m
e , h
m
e ), characterized by h˙
m
t = 0. It thus remains to solve, with respect to ht, the following
diﬀerential equation governing the change in the water table over time in the myopic competitive setting :
h˙mt = bd− hmt
Thanks to a standard computation and recalling that we assumed that h0 = 1, the myopic competitive intertem-
poral optimal path can then be written as:
hmt = g
m
t = h
m
e + (1− hme ) e−t ∀t
fmt = f
m
e = d ∀t
where hme = bd.
B. Proof of proposition 3.4
In order to solve the problem stated in definition 3.3, we are going to use the maximum principle. Let H denotes the
current value Hamiltonian of this problem:
H(ht, gt, ft, µt) = −
1
2
g2t + htgt + dft −
1
2
f2t −
1
2
¡
ht − h¯
¢2
+ µt (bft − gt)
According to the maximum principle, the eﬃcient solution (h∗t , g
∗
t , f
∗
t , µ
∗
t ) satisfies the following necessary conditions:
g∗t = h
∗
t − µ∗t h˙∗t = bf∗t − g∗t
f∗t = d+ bµ
∗
t µ˙
∗
t = rµ
∗
t −
¡
g∗t − h∗t + h¯
¢
lim
t→∞
e−rtµ∗t = 0
Remark 1. Using the Arrow suﬃciency theorem, it is obvious to check that these conditions are also suﬃcient since
∂hhH∗ = 0, where H∗ denotes the maximized Hamiltonian corresponding to the eﬃcient setting.
In order to fully characterize the eﬃcient paths, we then solve the following dynamic system:Ã
h˙∗t
µ˙∗t
!
=
Ã
bd
−h¯
!
+
Ã
−1 b2 + 1
0 r + 1
!
| {z }
A∗
Ã
h∗t
µ∗t
!
Since detA∗ = −r−1 < 0, we deduce from the trace/determinant criteria that the path leading to the eﬃcient steady
state (g∗e , h
∗
e , µ
∗
e) characterized by h˙
∗
t = 0 and µ˙
∗
t = 0, is unstable except on the stable trajectories which directions
are given by the eigenvector
Ã
1
0
!
associated to the eigenvalue −1 which is satisfying the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
e−rtµ∗t = 0. The steady state is thus a saddle point.
After some simple computations, the stable intertemporal eﬃcient paths are given by the following system:
µ∗t =
h¯
r + 1
, f∗t = d+
bh¯
r + 1
∀t
h∗t = h
∗
e + (1− h∗e) e−t
g∗t = g
∗
e + (1− h∗e) e−t
where g∗e = bd+
h¯b2
r+1 and h
∗
e = bd+
h¯(b2+1)
2r+1 .
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C. Proof of proposition 3.5
Some simple computations on the previous results tell us that:
f∗t − fmt = bµ∗e > 0 ∀t
h∗t − hmt =
¡
b2 + 1
¢
µ∗e
¡
1− e−t
¢
> 0 ∀t 6= 0
g∗t − gmt = b2µ∗e
¡
1− e−t
¢
− µ∗ee−t < 0 for t < − ln b
2
1+b2
> 0 for t > − ln b2
1+b2
D. Proof of proposition 4.2
The double problem stated in definition 4.1 can be solved using the maximum principle; it admits two current value
Hamiltonians:
Hf (ht, ft, pt) = dft −
1
2
f2t −
w
2
¡
ht − h¯
¢2
+ pt (bft − g¯t)
Hg(ht, gt, λt) = −
1
2
g2t + htgt −
ω
2
¡
ht − h¯
¢2
+ λt
¡
bf¯t − gt
¢
According to the maximum principle, the solution (holt , g
ol
t , f
ol
t , λ
ol
t , p
ol
t ) satisfies the following necessary conditions:
golt = h
ol
t − λolt folt = d+ bpolt
h˙olt = bf
ol
t − golt
λ˙
ol
t = rλ
ol
t −
£
golt − ω
¡
holt − h¯
¢¤
p˙olt = rp
ol
t −
£
−w
¡
holt − h¯
¢¤
lim
t→∞
e−rtλolt = 0 lim
t→∞
e−rtpolt = 0
Remark 2. Using the Arrow suﬃciency theorem, it is obvious to check that these conditions are also suﬃcient if
and only if ω = 1. Indeed, in such a setting, we can check that ∂hhHolf = −w and ∂hhHolg = 0, where Holf and Holg
denote the maximized Hamiltonian in the open-loop setting corresponding respectively to the agricultural and water
authorities’ maximization problem.
We have then the following dynamic system to solve:
⎛
⎜⎝
h˙olt
p˙olt
λ˙
ol
t
⎞
⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎝
bd
−wh¯
−ωh¯
⎞
⎟⎠ +
⎛
⎜⎝
−1 b2 1
w r 0
−1 + ω 0 r + 1
⎞
⎟⎠
| {z }
Aol
⎛
⎜⎝
holt
polt
λolt
⎞
⎟⎠
The characteristic polynomial of the matrix Aol is a cubic-root one: −ρ3+2rρ2+ρ
¡
r − r2 +wb2 + ω
¢
− r2−wrb2−
wb2 − ωr. Aol has thus three eigenvalues denoted ρ, ρ1 and ρ2. We then directly deduce from Cardan’s formula and
r < 1 that there are one real, ρ, and two complex eigenvalues, one being the conjugate of the other (ρ2 := a+ ib and
ρ3 := a− ib, for instance): ¡
−r2 − wrb2 − wb2 − ωr
¢2
+
4
27
¡
r − r2 + wb2 + ω
¢3
> 0
We furthermore know that:
detAol = ρρ1ρ2 = −r
2 − wrb2 −wb2 − ωr < 0
Since ρ2ρ3 = a
2 + b2 > 0, the real eigenvalue is always negative. Furthermore, we know from
trAol = ρ+ ρ1 + ρ2 = 2r > 0
that a > r. and, in case (iii), there exists a unique eigenvalue with a negative real part satisfying the transversality
conditions lim
t→∞
e−rtλolt = 0 and lim
t→∞
e−rtpolt = 0: it is the real negative one ρ. But it is important to note that since
this eigenvalue contains a square root, according to the values of our parameters, it can be either real or complex.
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So, the path leading to the general UWAIP stationary equilibrium
¡
gole , h
ol
e , λ
ol
e , p
ol
e
¢
, is unstable except on the
stable trajectories which directions are given by the eigenvector associated to the negative eigenvalue:
⎛
⎜⎝
1
w
ρ−r
1−ω
r+1−ρ
⎞
⎟⎠.
The stationary equilibrium is thus also a saddle point in this setting. After some simple computations, the stable
intertemporal paths of the other variables can be deduced as:
folt = f
ol
e +
bw(1−hole )
ρ−r e
ρt golt = g
ol
e +
(1−hole )(r−ρ+ω)
r+1−ρ e
ρt
holt = h
ol
e +
¡
1− hole
¢
eρt
polt = p
ol
e +
w(1−hole )
ρ−r e
ρt λolt = λ
ol
e +
(1−ω)(1−hole )
r+1−ρ e
ρt
where gole =
br[d(r+ω)+bh¯w]
wb2(r+1)+r(r+ω) , f
ol
e =
r[d(r+ω)+bh¯w]
wb2(r+1)+r(r+ω) , h
ol
e =
b(r+1)(dr+h¯wb)+rh¯ω
wb2(r+1)+r(r+ω) , p
ol
e =
w[−bd(r+1)+rh¯]
wb2(r+1)+r(r+ω) and λ
ol
e =
rbd(1−ω)+h¯(wb2+ωr)
wb2(r+1)+r(r+ω) .
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Figure E.1: Synopsis of results
F. Proof of proposition 4.3
Simple computations lead to the following results:
(i)
fωt − fmt = 0 ∀t, gωe − gme = 0
hωt − hmt = λωe
¡
1− e−t
¢
> 0 ∀t 6= 0
gωt − gmt = −λωe e−t < 0 ∀t9∞
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(ii)
hωt − h∗t = −b2µ∗e
¡
1− e−t
¢
< 0 ∀t 6= 0
gωt − g∗t = −b2µ∗e
¡
1− e−t
¢
< 0 ∀t 6= 0
fωt − f∗t = −bµ∗e < 0 ∀t
G. Proof of proposition 4.4
(i) According to our assumptions, 1−h
ωw
e
φ−r < 0 and
µ∗t − p
ωw
t =
bd (r + 1) + h¯b2
(r + 1) (r + b2)
− 1− h
ωw
e
φ− r e
φt > 0 ∀t
Furthermore, since pωwt = p
ωw
e +
1−hωwe
φ−r e
ρt and pωwe =
−bd(r+1)+rh¯
(r+1)(r+b2)
,
• bd (r + 1) > rh¯⇒ pωwt < 0 ∀t,
• bd (r + 1) < rh¯⇒ pωwt > 0 ∀t > 1φ ln
pωwe (r−φ)
1−hωwe
.
(ii) The comparison between the amounts of food consumed in a European UWAIP setting and in a WFD one,
fωwt − fωt = bpωwe +
b (1− hωwe )
φ− r e
φt
leads us to two diﬀerent cases:
• pωwe < 0⇒ fωwt − fωt < 0 ∀t;
• pωwe > 0⇒ fωwt − fωt > 0 ∀t > 1φ ln
pωwe (r−φ)
1−hωwe
.
Finally, comparing the amount of food consumed in the European UWAIP setting with the eﬃcient one leads to:
f∗t − fωwt =
b2
¡
dr + d+ bh¯
¢
(r + 1) (r + b2)
− b (1− h
ωw
e )
φ− r e
φt > 0 ∀t
H. Numerical example for which an UWAIP setting is worse than a WFD one
at each period of time
Aquifer height paths Groundwater consumption paths
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Food consumption paths
b=0,16 d=2 (i.e. polt < 0 ∀t) r=0,05 and h¯=1/2
The green color is for the WFD setting and the blue one for an UWAIP one.
I. The ineﬃciency of an UWAIP setting
Aquifer height paths Groundwater consumption paths
b=0,16 d=2 (i.e. polt < 0 ∀t) r=0,05 and h¯=1/2
The red color is for the eﬃcient setting and the blue one for an UWAIP one.
Aquifer height paths Groundwater consumption paths
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b=0,018 d=1,2 (i.e. polt > 0 ∀t > 2, 39) r=0,05 and h¯=1/2
J. NPV computations
 
8
3=h  
2
1=h  
4
3=h
mNPVNPV −*  1,31 2,33 5,23 
ωNPVNPV −*  0,03 0,06 0,13 
mNPVNPV −ω  1,27 2,27 5,10 
wNPVNPV ω−*  0,87 0,90 0,97 
mw NPVNPV −ω 0,44 1,43 4,26 
wNPVNPV −*  5,59 5,18 4,45 
mw NPVNPV −  -4,28 -2,86 0,78 
esNPVNPV −*  0,88 0,90 0,96 
mes NPVNPV −  0,43 1,42 4,27 
 
r=0,05 b=0,16 d=0,8
 
8
3=h  
2
1=h  
4
3=h
mNPVNPV −*  1,27 2,27 5,10 
ωNPVNPV −*  0 0 0 
mNPVNPV −ω  1,27 2,27 5,10 
wNPVNPV ω−*  0 0 0 
mw NPVNPV −ω 1,27 2,27 5,10 
wNPVNPV −*  0,39 0,15 0,45 
mw NPVNPV −  0,88 2,11 4,65 
esNPVNPV −*  0,01 0,01 0 
mes NPVNPV −  1,26 2,26 5,10 
r=0,05 b=0,018 d=1,2
K. Proof of proposition 5.1
(i) In order to check that the implementation of the theoretical fiscal scheme (Tωw, Sωwt ) leads to the European
UWAIP policy as defined previously, we put it in the myopic competitive program. The necessary and suﬃcient FOC
become the following one:
gωwit = h
ωwi
t −
h¯
r + 1
fωwit = d+ b
µ
pωwe +
1− hωwe
ρ− r e
ρt
¶
We can then directly check that the long-run demand functions coincide with the one defining an European UWAIP
from the new diﬀerential equation governing the aquifer height variations along time, h˙ωwit = bd+b
2
³
pωwe +
1−hωwe
ρ−r e
ρt
´
−
hωwit +
h¯
r+1 , which admits the following solution:
hωwit = h
ωw
e + (1− hωwe ) eρt = hωwt
since hωwie = bd+ b
2pωwe +
h¯
r+1 = h
ωw
e .
In order to check that the implementation of the practical (because of being a stationary one) fiscal scheme
(Tωw, Sωw) leads to the uncoordinated policy as defined previously, we put it in the myopic competitive program.
The necessary and suﬃcient FOC then become the following one:
gωwirt = h
ωwir
t −
h¯
r + 1
fωwirt = d+
−b2d (r + 1) + h¯br
(r + 1) (r + b2)
The long-run demand functions then directly come from the new diﬀerential equation governing the aquifer height
variations along time, h˙ωwirt = bd+
−b3d(r+1)+h¯b2r
(r+1)(r+b2)
− hωwirt + h¯r+1 :
hωwirt = h
ωwir
e +
³
1− hωwire
´
e−t
gωwirt = g
ωwir
e +
³
1− hωwire
´
e−t
fωwirt = f
ωwir
e ∀t
where hωwire =
b(r+1)(dr+h¯b)+rh¯
(r+1)(r+b2)
, gωwire =
br[d(r+1)+bh¯]
(r+1)(r+b2)
and fωwire =
r[d(r+1)+bh¯]
(r+1)(r+b2)
.
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(ii) If we now compare these solutions with the one obtained previously, we have the following results:
hωwirt − hωt = b2pωwe
¡
1− e−t
¢
hωwirt − hmt =
∙
b2pωwe +
h¯(b2+r)
(r+1)(r+b2)
¸ ¡
1− e−t
¢
gωwirt − gωt = gωwirt − gmt = b2pωwe
¡
1− e−t
¢
fωwirt − fωt = fωwirt − fmt = bpωwe
¡
1− e−t
¢
which strongly depend on the aquifer shadow price taken into account by the agricultural authority sign.
(iii) We finally have that:
h∗t − hωwirt =
b3(dr+d+bh¯)
(r+1)(r+b2)
¡
1− e−t
¢
> 0 ∀t 6= 0
g∗t − gωwirt =
b3(dr+d+bh¯)
(r+1)(r+b2)
¡
1− e−t
¢
> 0 ∀t 6= 0
f∗t − fωwirt =
b2(dr+d+bh¯)
(r+1)(r+b2)
¡
1− e−t
¢
> 0 ∀t 6= 0
L. Proof of proposition 5.2
(i) With such a fiscal scheme, the necessary FOC, which are also suﬃcient, are the following one:
g∗it = h
∗i
t −
h¯
r + 1
f∗it = d+
bh¯
r + 1
∀t
The diﬀerential equation governing the change in the water table over time thus becomes:
h˙∗it = bd− h∗it +
h¯
¡
b2 + 1
¢
r + 1
And thanks to standard computations, the intertemporal path can then be written as:
h∗it = h
∗i
e +
³
1− h∗ie
´
e−t
g∗it = g
∗i
e +
³
1− h∗ie
´
e−t
where h∗ie = bd+
h¯(b2+1)
r+1 and g
∗i
e = bd+
h¯b2
r+1 .
(ii) It obvious to check that:
T ∗g∗ie = µ
∗
eb
µ
d+
h¯b
r + 1
¶
= S∗f∗ie
and that:
T ∗g∗it = bdµ
∗
e + µ
∗
e
h¯b2
r + 1
+ µ∗e
³
1− h∗ie
´
e−t > bdµ∗e +
h¯b2
r + 1
µ∗e = S
∗f∗it
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